VC / JSON-LD example review — 9 November 2026

RESULT
All three JSON listings in the full paper were reviewed and executed. One
substantive context defect was corrected. The revised examples support the
semantic claims made about them when read with the stated profile assumptions.
The original executive brief contained no JSON listings. Following the user's
request, complete signed examples have now been added to full-paper Appendix C
and executive-brief Appendix A; the additional cryptographic checks are below.

INVENTORY AND CORRECTIONS
1. Battery claim, Section 2.1, PDF page 7.
   Valid JSON-LD. It expands to one statement: battery/4711 has the specified
   recycledCobaltShare property with integer value 16. The wording now calls it
   an unsigned claim fragment and explains that its vocabulary must define the
   unit. The integer itself does not encode percentage points. Issuer-proof
   verification is described conditionally; no proof is present in this listing.

2. Proposition P1, Section 5.2, PDF page 20.
   The original vct member had no context mapping. Ordinary JSON-LD processing
   discarded it, while jsonld.js safe mode rejected the input. The revised
   context maps vct to ex:credentialType with IRI-valued objects. This preserves
   the type identifier in RDF and is explicitly identified as an example-specific
   mapping, not an official SD-JWT vocabulary. The intended disagreement between
   the JSON schema and SHACL policy remains valid.

3. Proposition P2, Section 5.2, PDF page 21.
   The type-scoped context witness is correct. Full disclosure produces ex:v1;
   withholding @type produces ex:v2 while the context remains identical. The
   revised explanation separates authenticated issuer/type metadata from the
   explicit application projection used for RDF processing. It also distinguishes
   signature/disclosure validity from acceptance under a credential profile.

EXECUTED CHECKS
- All three listings parse as JSON, with no duplicate member names.
- jsonld.js 8.3.3 accepts all three under lossless/safe processing. A loader
  rejects any unexpected remote context request; these fixtures use inline
  contexts and do not depend on network retrieval.
- The battery statement has the expected subject, predicate and xsd:integer 16.
- Ajv 8.17.1 accepts P1 under the stated numeric-value application schema.
- Independently, RDFLib 7.6.0 converts P1 to the expected three RDF triples.
  pySHACL 0.40.2 executes a shape targeting ex:Limit and requiring ex:unit with
  sh:minCount 1: exactly one expected violation. Adding unit: "kg" gives four
  triples and passes. This positive control tests presence only, not a unit
  vocabulary or physical correctness.
- P2's complete and withheld-type RDF datasets match the stated witness.
- An actual ES256 issuer signature and RFC 9901 object-member disclosure were
  generated and verified for P2 using a locally fixed public key and a permissive
  example profile. Both presentations pass. Five negative cases reject: altered
  payload, altered signature, altered disclosure, duplicate disclosure, and an
  uncommitted disclosure. The generated public test vector contains no private key.
- A separate review of the revised passages found no further substantive issue.

COMPLETE SIGNED EXAMPLES — FOLLOW-UP ADDITION
The new examples/ folder and both appendices contain a complete VCDM 2.0
credential with a real eddsa-rdfc-2022 DataIntegrityProof and the same signed
credential disclosed as one object in a complete ES256 SD-JWT. All signature
bytes, public verification keys and the complete combined token are provided;
the old illustrative placeholder signatures were not reused.

The maintained-library test runner reports 4 accepted controls and 13 expected
rejections. These include both complete positive examples, changed claims,
proofs and contexts, loss of undefined claims, removal of assertion authority,
outer-signature/disclosure tampering, duplicate/uncommitted/colliding disclosures,
withholding the required inner credential, and a valid outer envelope containing
an invalid inner proof. The latter passes outer-only verification and fails the
required combined verification, as it should.

A second public script reports 9 positive assertions and 8 negative checks.
It directly verifies Ed25519 and ES256 with Node/OpenSSL and independently
reconstructs signature inputs and the disclosure commitment. RDF processing
dependencies are shared, so this is an independent signature-path check, not
a claim of two independent RDF implementations. Both reports pass.

The compact plain JSON is 797 UTF-8 bytes and the combined token is 1,534 ASCII
bytes. The nested case adds an ES256 verification and disclosure hash/check to
the inner Ed25519 verification and its two canonicalizations/two explicit hashes.
These are artifact sizes and algorithmic counts, not measured latency results.

Public verification is reproducible using examples/README.txt. The original
keys were used only in memory; private keys were not saved or bundled. Exact
fixture hashes are in examples/fixtures-manifest.json. The complete LaTeX
listings load these validated files directly, with visual wrapping only.

SCOPE BOUNDARIES
The three original semantic fragments remain pedagogical fragments; the two
new complete credential examples provide the previously missing signed cases.

The new examples cryptographically validate their Data Integrity and outer
signatures under the documented local profile. This is not a full SD-JWT VC or
W3C VC conformance suite, a holder-binding/status/remote-discovery test, qualified
issuance, or EUDI/QEAA legal-compliance demonstration. The supplied scripts are
local example verifiers. They do not reproduce the paper's performance benchmarks.

PRIMARY SPECIFICATIONS CONSULTED
- W3C JSON-LD 1.1, type-scoped contexts:
  https://www.w3.org/TR/json-ld11/#scoped-contexts
- W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0, credential structure:
  https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/
- W3C Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0, securing data losslessly:
  https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-integrity/#securing-data-losslessly
- RFC 9901, SD-JWT verification:
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9901.html#section-7.1
- SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials, draft 26, 6 November 2026:
  https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-26.html

EVIDENCE AND SOURCE TRACEABILITY
source/credential-review/ contains the test results, generated public SD-JWT
vector, SHACL shape, RDF outputs, and validation reports. The results record the
SHA-256 hash of the reviewed full-paper main.tex. Reproducible local test scripts
and pinned dependencies remain under latex-production/credential-review/ in the
project workspace; they are QA tools and are not part of the paper's benchmark.

The reviewed Word originals are unchanged. The final LaTeX includes the specific
semantic corrections described above. See conversion-qa.txt for PDF build,
licence, reference and visual checks. This report supplements editorial-review.txt;
it does not remove that report's evidence limitations.
